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26 Oct 2026

Carter-Ruck Ruling Sets High Bar For Overriding Privilege – Claire Cross published in Law360

In a significant ruling on legal professional privilege, the High Court has clarified the limits of the Solicitors Regulation Authority’s powers to compel law firms to disclose privileged material.

In Law360, Claire Cross, Partner at Corker Binning, analyses the decision in Carter-Ruck Solicitors v Solicitors Regulation Authority and its implications for law firms facing regulatory investigations.

On Sept. 21, the King’s Bench Division of the High Court of Justice of England and Wales handed down its judgment in Carter-Ruck Solicitors v. Solicitors Regulation Authority Ltd. The decision is significant for its examination of the relationship between statutory regulatory powers and fundamental common-law rights. The issue under consideration was whether Section 44B of the Solicitors Act 1974 empowered the SRA to compel solicitors to produce documents protected by their clients’ legal professional privilege, or LPP, where the client had not waived that privilege. Judge Christopher Butcher concluded that it did not.

Background

The matter found its way to the High Court as a result of an ongoing SRA investigation into Carter-Ruck Solicitors and one of its partners. The ongoing investigation, which commenced in September 2023, concerned Carter-Ruck’s conduct while acting for one of its clients, Mohamed Amersi, in bringing or threatening data protection and defamation claims in 2021 and 2022.

Carter-Ruck, the relevant partner and Amersi, although not the target of the SRA’s investigation, deny any wrongdoing, including any suggestion that they sought to mislead the court.

As part of its investigation, the SRA issued three Section 44B production notices, requiring the firm to produce documents from its client files relating to Amersi and his litigation, including material that was covered by LPP. Those notices were dated Aug. 10, 2024; Feb. 25, 2025; and Oct. 6, 2025.

Carter-Ruck and Amersi liaised with the SRA over a number of months in respect of LPP material that the SRA asserted was covered by the notices.

The SRA has historically taken a robust position as to the scope of the Section 44B power in relation to privileged material. Its published guidance expressly states that solicitors may be required to provide material subject to LPP, placing firms served with production notices in the difficult position of reconciling their obligations to the regulator with their duty to preserve their clients’ privilege.

On Oct. 7, 2025, the SRA withdrew its first notice but maintained the other two, requiring compliance by Oct. 14 and 21, 2025, respectively.

After the SRA declined to suspend the notices, Carter-Ruck and Amersi commenced Part 8 proceedings on Oct. 14, seeking a declaration that Section 44B did not empower the SRA to compel the production of material protected by LPP.

The Principal Arguments

Carter-Ruck’s key argument was that Section 44B did not contain sufficiently clear words to override LPP. It argued that LPP is a fundamental common-law right and, under the principle of legality, Parliament must use express words or necessarily clear language if it intends legislation to override such a right. In its submission, the general power to require solicitors to produce documents could not therefore be interpreted as permitting the SRA to compel privileged material without the client’s consent.

The SRA’s key argument was that Section 44B should be interpreted as giving it the power to obtain privileged material where this was necessary for its regulatory investigations. It argued that effective regulation of solicitors requires the SRA to be able to investigate potential misconduct fully, including misconduct that may only be revealed by examining privileged documents.

The SRA also relied on its intervention powers under Section 35 and Part II of Schedule 1 of the 1974 act. In an intervention, the SRA can require delivery of the solicitor’s documents, including documents subject to the client’s LPP.

The SRA argued that it would be inconsistent for the same statutory document-production mechanism, when applied through Section 44B, not to permit access to privileged material in the course of an investigation.

The court ultimately found in Carter-Ruck’s favour.

Analysis of the Judgment

This judgment is best understood within the wider line of authority concerning the constitutional protection afforded to LPP. The courts have consistently recognized LPP as a fundamental right, reflecting the public interest in enabling clients to communicate openly with their legal advisers without fear that those communications will subsequently be compelled into disclosure. This explains the high threshold for its abrogation.

The judge’s reasoning in this matter was rooted in the principle of legality. Drawing on the Court of Appeal’s 2000 decision in R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms, Judge Butcher emphasized that fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous statutory language. Parliament must use sufficiently clear words if it intends to authorize such an interference.

This principle was decisive in the construction of Section 44B of the 1974 act. Although the provision conferred extensive powers on the SRA to obtain documents and information for regulatory investigations, it did not expressly extend those powers to material protected by LPP.

The judge considered whether such an override could arise by necessary implication, but concluded that the statutory language did not meet the required threshold. It was not sufficiently clear that Parliament had intended to authorize an interference with LPP.

The judgment also drew upon Parliament’s previous consideration of the issue. An express amendment concerning LPP had been proposed during the passage of the relevant legislation but was not enacted.

The court was therefore required to exercise caution before interpreting the legislation as achieving through implication what Parliament had declined to provide expressly. This reinforces the constitutional distinction between interpreting statutory powers and creating new ones: Where Parliament intends a regulator to possess a power capable of overriding a fundamental right, it must provide sufficiently clear legislative authority.

The judge was also not swayed by the arguments that the SRA’s job would be made much more difficult if it were unable to gain access to LPP material, nor that providing LPP material to the SRA was somehow a lesser infringement than it would be if provided to another party, or no infringement at all.

In rejecting these arguments, Judge Butcher followed principles established by the House of Lords’ 1996 ruling in R v. Derby Magistrates’ Court, its 2003 ruling in R (Morgan Grenfell & Co. Ltd.) v. Special Commissioner of Income Tax, and the Court of Appeal’s 2021 decision in Sports Direct International PLC v. Financial Reporting Council.

In particular, the Sports Direct decision established that disclosure of privileged material to a regulator remains an infringement of LPP; the fact that it is a regulator requesting the information rather than an opposing litigant does not diminish the protection afforded by the privilege.

What This Means for SRA Investigations

First, there will be a large number of SRA investigations that are not affected by this judgment: for example, where a client has complained about their solicitor and has therefore waived, or is capable of waiving, privilege by putting the advice or conduct in issue.

Nor does the judgment affect material that is not privileged in the first place, including, for example, evidence relevant to allegations of workplace bullying or harassment. The position is also unchanged where the iniquity exception applies, since communications made in furtherance of fraud or other iniquity do not attract LPP.

Equally, the SRA remains able to rely on evidence obtained from other sources, including communications between parties in cases involving abuse-of-process allegations.

Finally, the judgment is concerned with compulsory production: There is no impediment to the SRA obtaining privileged material where the client has consented to its disclosure or has otherwise waived privilege.

However, the judgment does put the brakes on cases in which the alleged misconduct can only, or principally, be investigated by examining the solicitor’s confidential communications with the client.

Examples of this will include allegations that a solicitor advanced a claim without reasonable grounds or without giving appropriate advice; advised or assisted a client in pursuing litigation oppressively; or pursued litigation for an improper purpose without properly investigating the client’s motives or giving appropriate advice. In such cases, the evidence will be found within the solicitor-client relationship and will likely be protected by LPP and consequently outside the ambit of a Section 44B production requirement.

A further and potentially messier question is what becomes of privileged material that the SRA has already obtained on the (now-unlawful) footing that Section 44B entitled it to require production.

The judgment does not address that question, and it does not follow automatically that such material must be returned or destroyed. Much will depend on the circumstances in which it was obtained, whether privilege was asserted or waived, and whether the material has subsequently been used.

An additional wrinkle is that the SRA had repeatedly communicated to law firms that it considered its Section 44B powers to extend to material protected by LPP. This created a particular regulatory tension: The SRA was not simply asserting a legal position in litigation, but communicating that position to the very firms over which it exercised regulatory and disciplinary authority.

Firms may therefore have been concerned that declining to comply with a Section 44B request on the basis of LPP could itself attract regulatory scrutiny, creating a practical pressure to disclose material notwithstanding the absence of clear statutory authority for the SRA’s position.

Takeaways for Lawyers

Where a notice seeks material that is arguably subject to the client’s unwaived LPP, firms will need to consider whether production can properly be required following the judgment.

Firms should distinguish privileged material from nonprivileged material rather than treating an entire file as either privileged or nonprivileged.

Firms that have already supplied privileged material to the SRA under Section 44B may need to consider the circumstances in which it was provided and whether any further use of that material should be challenged. The judgment itself does not determine what should happen to material already obtained.

Regulators should identify the precise statutory source of any coercive power and recognize the limits of what can properly be inferred from general statutory language. Where effective regulation requires an interference with a fundamental right, the appropriate solution may be legislative clarification rather than an expansive interpretation of existing powers.

For firms currently under investigation, the key takeaway is that a Section 44B notice should not be treated as an instruction to hand over everything within its scope where that includes potentially privileged material.

Conclusion
The wider lesson for all regulators is one of statutory discipline. Broad investigatory or information-gathering powers should not be assumed to include authority to interfere with fundamental rights. Firms should not be deterred from challenging regulators that seek to require the production of material beyond that expressly provided for by legislation.

Where the statutory basis for a request is unclear, firms are entitled to scrutinize and, where appropriate, challenge the regulator’s position.

The High Court has now granted the SRA permission to appeal the ruling directly to the U.K.
Supreme Court, meaning that this matter will be revisited. This will almost undoubtedly mean that a number of cases are likely to face delays.

First published by Law360 on 23 October 2026.

 

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